CSIS-MEI event (Part I)
'US turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear program'

By Rana Fawad

WASHINGTON: Two British journalists have claimed in their book that the US on many occasions turned a blind eye to let Pakistan build its nuclear program and this approach ultimately led to the attempts to proliferate nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea by A Q Khan network. (Please click on CSIS PRESS CENTER for the audio of Adrian's presentation).

Authors of ‘The Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons,’ Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, were addressing a gathering about this book at an event jointly arranged by the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Middle East Institute last week (Friday, November 9).

Co-director PCR Frederick D Barton moderated the proceedings whereas President CSIS John Hamre, President MEI Wendy J Chamberlin, MEI Scholar Marvin Weinbaum, Co-director PCR Karin von Hippel, Director of CSIS International Program Stephen Flangan, former Ambassador to Pakistan Robert B Oakley, former officials, students, members of Pakistani-American as well as Indian-American community were also present on the occasion.

During Q&A seession, an aduience member Larry Robinson (he was Political Counselor at US Embassy in Islamabad during A Q Khan controversy) urged the audience to keep their minds open instead of going for only one narrative when two narratives are available about relatively few known facts. Referring to the charge made by the authors that Khan was not asked all the questions promised by the government, he said according to his knowledge Khan was questioned intensively and the US got answers to all questions it provided to the Musharraf government.

He mentioned that he (Dr Khan) was interviewed at great length by two generals, Ishan ul Haq (the head of ISI) and Khalid Kidwai (the head of the nuclear program). “They spent many many hours with him and told me and told many others that the man was one of the most accomplished liars they had ever seen in their life and it was impossible to get him to admit to anything unless presented with incontrovertible evidence at which point he completely switched his point of view and became equally convincing in his story,” he said.

As for the authors’ objection that the US was not granted access to A Q Khan for questioning, Larry Robinson said, “I don’t remember the US granting Britain access to Rosenberg. I don’t remember any country that has had a nuclear spy working for somebody else ever granting access to any third country.”

He said in case the US was given access to Khan, “The first thing he was going to do was to say that he had full authorization all the way, whether or not that was true.” He added that the second thing Khan would have talked about was Pakistan’s covert import program of which Khan was a very essential part.

He said that the covert import program exists to this day for the very good reason “that even if they didn’t have nuclear weapons at all, we won’t let Pakistan import even essential safety equipment for their safeguarded nuclear power plants that got to have a covert import program.”

As for Khan’s wealth, he said everybody in Islamabad knew he was rich “but everybody in Islamabad figured that he was getting rich the way everybody else in Islamabad officialdom does – by creaming off a percentage of all the imported stuff.”

Responding to Catherine Scott-Clark’s query why is that no one can clearly answer what exactly Pakistan provided N Korea or how far the negotiations went with Syria or Saudi Arabia or surely there are people in Islamabad who could help to get to the bottom of what actually Iran has, Larry said, “I don’t know how many people really knew how much,” and added by suggesting a parallel of A Q Khan, “I don’t think Hyman Rickover’s [known as the father of Nuclear Navy] brief case was ever examined careflly when he left the Navy nuclear programs.”

“Rickover could have done everything what A Q Khan did. He had exactly the same type of authority. He was in charge of his own authority. He was his own boss because he was the head of the Navy program for the Atomic Energy Commission,” Larry mentioned.

Responding to the authors’ claim that General Zia had commissioned the then ISI chief Hamid Gul and Vice Chief of Army General Aslam Beg to look into the army’s direction beyond Afghtan-Soviet war, Robert Oakley (former US Ambassador to Pakistan) made a factual comment and said, “Hamid Gul became head of ISI only after Zia died. At that point his influence and his wacky ideas began to grow.” He said up until that time Zia and General Rehman [Akhtar Abdur Rehman] had kept the nuclear program under control.

He also said that book seemed to assume the US intelligence was omniscient and infallible, "I think we've seen time and time again not just in Iraq that this is wrong."
Continued.